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To control welfare costs and to assure that parents did not shift the cost of raising 
children to the society at large, Congress passed the Family Support Act of 1988 
requiring each state to develop presumptive child support guidelines. The majority of the 
states have implemented child support guidelines based on the principle of income 
sharing, by which parents are expected to share their income with their children to the 
same extent as if they were living together (Bassi & Barnow, 1993; Bartfeld, 2000). 
However, the particular details of implementing this principle can be quite different in 
different states. Three types of guidelines are common: the percentage-of-income 
guidelines, the income-shares guidelines, and the “Melson formula” guidelines. The 
percentage-of-income guidelines specify child support as a percentage of non-custodial 
income without considering the custodial income. The income-shares guidelines specify 
child support as a percentage of combined non-custodial and custodial incomes, and 
prorate the total support amount between parents according to each parent’s share of 
combined income. The “Melson formula” guidelines first allow for a self-support reserve 
for the non-custodial parent, then assign all excess non-custodial income to meet the 
basic needs of the child(ren), and finally assign a percentage of remaining income to the 
child(ren). As of the beginning of 2005 , 35 states used the income-shares guidelines, 13 
(including DC) followed the percentage-of-income guidelines, and 3 used the “Melson 
formula” guidelines (National Conference for State Legislators, 2004).
In most income-shares and percentage-of-income states, the percentage of 
parental income assigned to the child(ren) is based on economic studies of expenditure on 
children using data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Expenditure Survey. 
Because most child-rearing expenditures are made from disposable after-tax income,
economic studies typically have produced estimates on parental expenditure on children 
as a percentage of total expenditure and then net income.
States have grappled with whether to base their child support guidelines on gross 
or net income since guidelines were first developed (Judicial Council of California, 2001). 
A review of states’ guidelines information on the Internet shows that 30 states (including 
D.C.) used gross income and 21 used net income as of March 2005 . Among the 13 states 
that used the percentage-of-income approach, seven used the net income approach while 
the other six the gross income approach. Among the 35 states that used the income-shares 
approach, 11 used net income while 24  used gross income. The three states that used the 
“Melson formula” approach all used net income. The purpose of this study is to 
systematically investigate the relationship between gross income and net income 
approaches in child support guidelines in income-shares states.
Insert Table 1 about here
The relationship between net income and gross income is complicated because tax 
liability is dependent on family composition and consumption/investment behavior. As 
such, with the same amount of combined gross income, the available combined net 
income after divorce is different, sometimes quite substantially, from available combined 
net income before divorce. For income-shares states that take into consideration both 
parents’ income, the issue is even more complicated because the tax implications are 
different for the two parents once they split. As a result the non-custodial share of gross 
income can be very different from the non-custodial share of net income. Three general 
approaches have been used in income-shares states to deal with the issue of gross income
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vs. net income: the “actual net income” approach, the “standardized net income” 
approach, and the “gross income approach”.
The “actual net income” approach
Under the “actual net income” approach support awards tables are presented by 
combined net income. Net income is estimated and reported by the parents separately.
The actual net incomes from both parents are summed up to become the “combined net 
income”. The “combined net income” is used to locate the total support amount in the 
tables. The non-custodial parent then pays his or her share of that total based on his or her 
percentage share of net income.
As an example, the State of Florida asks the custodial and non-custodial parents to 
report their federal, state, and local income taxes as part of the allowable deduction, and 
subtract such taxes from their gross income. Net income is then computed for both 
parents. The child support award is based on the combined net income and the non­
custodial percentage share of net income.
The “standardized net income” approach
Under the “standardized net income” approach support awards tables are also 
presented by combined net income. In fact, the tables should look exactly the same as the 
one used under the “actual net income” approach if the same economic estimates on 
parental expenditure on children are used.
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However, parents are asked to report their respective gross income. Each parent’s 
tax liability and net income are estimated separately with standard assumptions on 
exemption status and child custody.
It is usually assumed that all income is earned income. Standard deductions are 
used for both parents. Depending on the actual custody arrangement, the filing status of 
each parent can be either “single” if the parent does not have custody of any children due 
support, or “head of household” if the parent has custody of children due support. New 
marriages and subsequent children do not change these standardized assumptions.
Federal and state income taxes, FICA, earned income credit (EIC), and child tax credits 
are explicitly taken into consideration with this approach. The standardized net income is 
computed for each parent and then summed up to form the “combined net income”. This 
“combined net income” is then used to locate the total support amount in the tables. The 
non-custodial parent’s portion is computed by multiplying the total amount by his or her 
net income share.
While several states use some form of the standardized net approach, most do not 
take into consideration EIC and child tax credit. For example, in South Dakota, both the 
custodial parent and non-custodial parent are allowed to subtract (1) FICA, (2) federal tax 
withholdings with two exemptions, and (3) mandatory retirement savings from their 
respective gross income. The true exemption status, EIC, and child tax credits are not 
taken into consideration.
The “gross income” approach
Under the “gross income” approach the support awards tables are presented by 
combined gross income. Assumptions about tax liabilities are implicitly incorporated into
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the tables. Usually one conversion is done to convert the combined gross income to 
combined net income as part of the construction of the support awards tables. Parents’ 
combined gross income is used to locate the total child support amount. The non­
custodial parent’s child support award is computed by multiplying the total amount by his 
or her gross income share.
Policy Studies Inc. (PSI), the leading consulting company in the field of child 
support guidelines policy, has conducted reviews and given recommendations to many 
states’ child support guidelines. PSI has used this approach for several states, including 
Arizona, Oregon, Utah, and DC. However, the actual assumptions made when converting 
combined gross income to combined net income are somewhat different depending on the 
state.
PSI typically has used withholding tables instead of actual tax rate schedules for 
the gross-net conversion. Two sets of assumptions have been used recently. One shall be 
called the “single withholding approach”, applied in Arizona (2003), Oregon (2001), and 
Utah (2002). The other is the “married withholding approach”, applied for the DC review 
in 2004 . Under both approaches all income is assumed to be wage income. Federal 
withholding, state withholding, and FICA are computed. Advance earned income credit 
(AEIC) can be incorporated into the calculations when appropriate. Child tax credit is not 
explicitly taken into consideration under either of these two withholding approaches.
Under the “single withholding approach”, it is assumed that all combined income 
is earned by the non-custodial parent with no dependents. Two withholding exemptions 
(one for deduction and one for exemption) are claimed. The withholding table for single 
person or head of household is used (Policy Studies Inc 2001 , 2002 , 2003). Under this
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assumption no AEIC is incorporated because single persons with no children are not 
eligible to receive AEIC, although they may be eligible to receive EIC as a tax refund. 
Also note under this method the estimated total tax liability is independent of the number 
of children due support.
Under the “married withholding approach” the family is assumed to be still intact 
so the married person withholding table is used. The argument for using this approach is 
that it’s consistent with the child-rearing measurements, which are from intact families. 
The total number of exemptions is two plus the number of children due support (District 
of Columbia Child Support Guideline Commission Final Reports, 2004). AEIC is 
explicitly incorporated, although one should note that AEIC is typically lower than actual 
EIC (the maximum AEIC payment for 2004  was $ 1,563 while the maximum EIC was 
$4 ,300). Total tax liability varies depending on the number of children due support.
A third possible approach is to use the actual filing process for the estimation of 
tax liabilities instead of using withholding tables. In this case “married filing jointly” 
would be used with the actual number of children due support claimed on the tax forms. 
EIC is fully incorporated. So is child tax credit.
Other approaches are possible in the gross to net conversion process. For example, 
the State of Indiana applies a uniform 21 .88% rate to convert gross to net. Because the 
process of conversion is hidden in the gross income states, unless the original study 
creating the guidelines can be located (such as Arizona and Oregon) or the process is so 
simplified that it’s written in the law (such as Indiana), the assumptions used in the 
conversion process often cannot be reconstructed from guidelines tables alone. As such, 
these other possible conversion approaches are not investigated in this study.
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Acknowledging that most child-rearing expenditures are made from net income, 
the policy discussion of pros and cons of these approaches in the literature hinges on 
three principles: (1) equity, (2) accuracy, and (3) simplicity. Equity refers to one party’s 
interest being unaffected by independent actions and strategies of the other party. This 
equity principle is equivalent to the principle of avoidance of externalities. Accuracy 
refers to whether the approach accurately reflects the economic situations of parties 
involved (American Law Institute, 2002; Judicial Council of California, 2001). The 
simplicity principle refers to how easy it is to administer a particular approach (Judicial 
Council of California, 2001).
The principle of equity argues in favor of the “standardized net income” approach 
and the “gross income” approach over the “actual net income” approach. The “actual net 
income” approach is the least equitable because tax liability can change significantly with 
subsequent family structure changes and consumption/investment behavior changes. 
Remarriage, addition of a child, or purchase of a home will all affect actual net income 
given the same gross income. As a consequence, the actions of either parent can affect 
the amount of child support. This approach is thus unfair because the support amount can 
be affected by the actions and/or strategies of one party without other parties having any 
control over such actions. The two other approaches can insulate the child support 
obligations from these individual actions and strategies and are thus more equitable 
(American Law Institute, 2002, Judicial Council of California, 2001).
Pros and Cons of the Three Approaches
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The principle of accuracy argues in favor of treating parents as separate tax units 
because they are subject to differing tax rules and rates due to different levels of income 
and dependents claiming status. This separate treatment allows the accurate computation 
of net income, from which most child-rearing expenditures are made. Among the three 
approaches presented, parents are treated as separate tax units in the two net income 
approaches, but as one unit in the “gross income” approach. As such the two net income 
approaches provide a more accurate picture of the economic situations of the parents than 
the “gross income” approaches (American Law Institute, 2002; Judicial Council of 
California, 2001; Rogers, M., 1999).
The principle of simplicity at the administrative level argues in favor of the “gross 
income” approach. Because tax liability assumptions are implicitly made when the tables 
are created, users of the tables (parents, administrators, lawyers) need not to have any 
knowledge of tax liability issues (Judicial Council of California, 2001). This principle 
would rank the “actual net income” approach the least favorable because the computation 
and verification of actual tax liability can be very difficult and time consuming. The 
“standardized net income” approach uses a standard set of tax assumptions to simplify 
the tax computation process. This approach has the potential of reaching the same level 
of simplicity as the “gross income” approach with the help of appropriate computer 
programming.
This paper concerns particularly the principles of equity and accuracy because 
even if a particular approach is chosen for its simplicity, it is still important for policy 
makers to know what prices in equity and accuracy they are paying for this simplicity. As 
discussed earlier, based on the principle of equity, the “standardized net income”
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approach and the “gross income” approach are better than the “actual net income” 
approach. Between the “standardized net income” approach and the “gross income” 
approaches, the former is more accurate than the latter. As such, the “standardized net 
income” approach should be considered the best approach with respect to the combined 
principles of equity and accuracy. Deviations from the support amounts generated from 
the “standardized net income” approach should be considered a bias. While it is difficult 
to judge what bias the “actual net income” method can produce because this method 
involves actual tax situations in calculations of support awards, it is possible to assess the 
bias when the “gross income” method is used. The important policy questions are: (1) 
how large is the bias, and (2) how is the bias distributed?
“Gross Income” Approach Bias -  Theoretical Relationships 
There are two potential issues that may cause bias in income-share states using 
the “gross income” approach: (1) The income share of non-custodial parent income based 
on net income may be higher or lower than the income share computed using gross 
income; and (2) The net income computed under any of the three sets of filing status 
assumptions may be higher or lower than parents filing separately as either “single” or 
“head of the household”. I will name the first one “income share bias” , and the second 
one “income conversion bias” .
Let
Pnet=Percentage of combined net income spent on children 
Pgra™=Percentage of combined gross income spent on children 
G„=Gross income of non-custodial parent 
Gc=Gross income of custodial parent
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Tn=Tax liability of non-custodial parent (federal, state, FICA), excluding EIC 
£’„=Earned income credit of non-custodial parent 
Tc=Tax liability of custodial parent (federal, state, FICA, child tax credit), 
excluding EIC 
£’c=Earned income credit of custodial parent
Wfo=Total tax withholding assuming all income earned by non-custodial parent 
filing single with 2 exemptions.
Wbm=Tota\ tax withholding assuming married with (2+ # of children) exemptions 
Tb=Total tax liability (federal, state, FICA, child tax credit) filing married jointly, 
excluding EIC 
£b=Total earned income credit if filing married jointly 
S;a=Amount of child support award using “gross income” approach with single 
withholding
Sib= Amount of child support award using “gross income” approach with married 
withholding
Sic= Amount of child support award using “gross income” approach with married 
filing jointly
S2=Amount of child support award using “standardized net income” approach 
We have
Gn
(1) S 1 = (Gn + Go) * Pgross * ---------- = Pgross * Gn
Gn + Gc
S2 = (Gn-Tn+En + Gc~Tc + E c)*P , ~ Gn ~ Tn + En
Gb=Combined gross income (=Gn+Gc)
(2) Qn-Tn + En + G c-Tc + Et
= Pnet * (Gn ~Tn + En)
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The percentage bias (overpayment if positive and underpayment if negative) is:
(3) Si  ^_ Pgross * Gn |
S 2 Pnet Gn ~Tn + En
The expenditure data give estimates on Pnet. In the process of converting Pnet to 
Pgross, assumptions are made about the taxes. Under the “standardized net income” 
approach, the relationship between Pgross and Pnet is
Gn ~Tn + En+ Gc ~Tc + Ec
(4) Pgross = Pnet * ----------------------------------
Gn + Gc
If using the “single withholding” approach, then
(5) Pgrossla — Pn - Gb~ WbS
Gn + Gc
If using “married withholding” approach then
Gb — Wibm
(6) Pgrosslb — P inet
Gn + Gc
If using “married filing jointly” approach then 
Gb — Tb + Eb
(7) Pgrosslc — Pnet ^
Gn + Gc
Substituting (4) into (3), we have
Si Gn Gn—Tn + En + G c— Tc + Ec
(8  )  1 = --------- * ------------------------------------------------ 1
S 2 Gn + Gc Gn-Tn + En
Equation (8) shows the “income share bias”. This is accomplished by assuming
separate filing in the conversion from Pnet to Pgross.
Substituting (5) into (3), (6) into (3), and (7) into (3) we have
Si Gn  ^ Gb-Wbs ^
S 2 a Gn + Gc Gn ~Tn + En
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( 1 0 )  ^  l = Gn  * G b - W b n ,
S  2b Gn  +  G c Gn ~ T n  +  En
S i  1 =  G n ^  G b - T b + E b  ^
S  2 a Gn +  G c Gn — Tn +  En
Equation (9), (10), and (11) take both the “income share” bias and the “income 
conversion” bias into consideration and thus show the total “gross income” approach bias. 
The only difference between these three equations is that (9) uses the “single 
withholding” approach, (10) uses the “married withholding” approach, and (11) uses the 
“married filing jointly approach”.
Estimating “Gross Income” Approach Bias - Simulations 
Because of the complexity of U.S. tax codes, the theoretical relationship of this 
bias does not easily lead to an assessment of the magnitude or even the direction of the 
bias. Certain tax structure assumptions need to be made for that assessment to be possible. 
For this study, all income is assumed to be earned income. When possible, the following 
taxes are considered: (1) federal income tax, (2) FICA (6.2% capped at $87,900 for 
Social Security tax and 1.45% for Medicare tax with no income cap), (3) EIC or AEIC, (4) 
child tax credit ($1000 per child until adjusted gross income reaches $75,000 for head of 
household or $110,000 for married filing jointly, after which the total credit amount 
decreases by 5 cents per dollar exceeding the limit), and (5) state income tax (Utah for 
this exercise). The tax codes for year 2004 are used. Additional assumptions are made for 
each of the approaches when appropriate.
For the “standardized net income” approach all the taxes mentioned above are 
taken into consideration. The federal and Utah income tax rate schedules are used (see
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Appendix Table A.1, A2, and A.3). Standard deductions are used in all tax liability 
calculations. The non-custodial parent is assumed to file as “single”, while the custodial 
parent is assumed to file as “head of household” . Number of exemptions equals to 
number of children plus one.
For the “single withholding” method, the single sections of the federal and Utah 
withholding schedules for annual payroll period are used (see Appendix Table 4, Table 5, 
and Table 6). Two exemptions are used. Note that neither EIC nor child tax credit can be 
taken into consideration with this approach. These are the assumptions used by PSI for 
the “single withholding” method.
For the “married withholding” method, the married sections of the federal and 
Utah withholding schedules for annual payroll period are used (see Appendix Table 4, 
Table 5, and Table 6). The number of exemptions equals to (2+ number of children due 
support). Note that EIC is only partially taken into consideration through the use of 
Advance EIC. The child tax credit cannot be incorporated with this approach. These are 
the assumptions used by PSI for the “married withholding” approach.
For the “married filing jointly” method, all taxes mentioned above are taken into 
consideration. The only difference between this approach and the “standardized net 
income” approach is the filing status is assumed to be “married filing jointly”. As such, 
income is combined. So is tax liability.
Because the three sets of tax computations under the “gross income” approach 
generate different levels of bias in support awards compared to the “standardized net 
income” approach, simulations are conducted using each set of these assumptions, plus 
the “standardized net income” approach. Non-custodial parent’s annual gross income is
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simulated in the range of $12,000 to $96,000, with $6,000 internals in-between. Very low 
incomes are not included because almost all states have a low income table to address the 
non-custodial poverty issue. These low income tables are minimum awards computed 
with mathematical interpolations. They do not follow the economic data on parental 
expenditures on children. For the custodial parent, annual gross income is simulated in 
the range of $0 to $96,000. Simulations are conducted for one child, two children, and 
three children.
In the simulations it is assumed that the custodial parent claims exemptions for 
the children in his or her custody. Note that in the case of custodial parent earnings zero 
income, the practical solution is for the non-custodial parent to claim all children due 
support. While this can be easily incorporated into the computations, it is not done in the 
simulations for the sake of consistency with the current practice of leaving this 
arrangement to the court instead of incorporating it into in the guidelines.
Results and Discussion
In this section “income share” bias in gross income-shares states is discussed first. 
Then the total bias in each of the three “gross income” methods - single withholding, 
married withholding, and married filing jointly - is discussed.
“Income share” bias
Regardless of which of the three “gross income” approaches is used, the “income 
share” bias (S1/S2-I in Equation 8) is the same for the same combined gross income and 
number of children. Figure 1 shows the percentage “income share” bias by non-custodial
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gross income for two children when custodial gross income is at $0, $6,000, $12,000, 
$24,000, $48,000, and $96,000.
Insert Figure 1 about here
“Income share” bias is zero when custodial income is zero because in this case the 
non-custodial income share is always 100%, net or gross. When custodial parent’s 
income is greater than zero, “income share” bias is positive in most cases except for very 
low non-custodial income coupled with much higher custodial income.
Within the simulation range for two children, the largest positive bias is 23% with 
$12,000 annual income for each parent. That means in this particular situation the gross 
income share of the non-custodial parent is 23% higher than the net income share of the 
non-custodial parent, leading to a support award that is 23% higher than that generated 
from using the “standardized net” approach, other things equal. This is caused by the 
custodial parent being able to take almost full advantage of EIC, child tax credit, and the 
dependent exemptions thereby leading to a negative tax liability (because of EIC). The 
non-custodial parent, on the other hand, cannot take advantage of any of these tax 
benefits.
The largest negative bias is -15% with $12,000 non-custodial income and $96,000 
custodial income, meaning that the non-custodial parent’s gross income share is 15% 
lower than his/her net income share. This is the case where the custodial parent is in a 
very high income tax bracket without being able to take full advantage of the tax credits 
due to high income, leading to a higher average tax rate compared to the non-custodial 
parent.
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For lower levels of custodial income, the “income share” bias is positive but 
decreases as the non-custodial income increases. For higher levels of custodial income, 
the “income share” bias changes from negative to positive as the non-custodial income 
increases. After non-custodial income reaches about $48,000 the “income share” bias 
becomes universally positive. The patterns for one child and three children are similar, 
with -17% to 15% as the largest bias points for the case of one child, and -13% and 23% 
for the case of three children. The income combination points for these largest bias cases 
are the same as for the two children case.
Total bias using the “single withholding” method
S1JS 2 -1 in Equation (9) is the percentage bias in support amount generated using 
the gross income “single withholding” method compared to that generated from the 
“standardized net income” method. The formula shows that the number of children does 
not affect the percentage bias, because the “single withhold method” assumes that the 
non-custodial parent earns all income and claims no dependents. Figure 2 shows the 
percentage bias in support award by non-custodial gross income when custodial gross 
income is at $0, $6,000, $12,000, $24,000, $48,000, and $96,000.
Insert Figure 2 about here 
When the non-custodial parent earns all income, the percentage bias in the child 
support award generated using the “single withholding” method is practically zero. This 
is not surprising because non-custodial parent earning all income is the scenario assumed 
in the gross-to-net conversion under this approach. When the custodial income is nonzero, 
the bias is negative, meaning that the child support award is lower than that generated
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from the “standardized net income” approach. Other things equal, the higher the non­
custodial income, the smaller the bias. However, other things equal, the higher the 
custodial income, the larger the bias.
The largest bias within the simulation range is -24% for a non-custodial income of 
$12,000 and custodial income of $96,000. The smallest bias is almost zero when 
custodial income is zero. These percentages can be converted to dollar amounts of 
monthly underpayment or overpayment using the PSI table of support proportions by net 
income with Rothbarth parameters (Appendix Table 7). An example case of a lower 
income household with $12,000 non-custodial income and $12,000 custodial income has 
a bias of -8%, resulting in a monthly underpayment of $16 for one child, $22 for two 
children, and $27 for three children. A middle income household with $36,000 non­
custodial income and $24,000 custodial income has a bias of -8%, resulting in a monthly 
underpayment of $43 for one child, $57 for two children, and $64 for three children. A 
higher income household with $60,000 non-custodial income and $36,000 custodial 
income has a bias of -5%, resulting in a monthly underpayment of $40 for one child, $53 
for two children, and $59 for three children.
As noted earlier in the theoretical relationship section, the total bias is composed 
of two components: the “income share” bias and the “income conversion” bias. In the 
case of the “single withholding” method, the combined tax liability is very much 
overestimated, resulting in a much lower combined net income than the actual situation. 
This negative “income conversion” bias leads to a lower support award. On the other 
hand, the usually positive “income share” bias leads to a higher support award. With the 
“single withholding” method, the magnitude of the “income conversion” bias is larger
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than that of the “income share” bias, resulting in lower support awards in virtually all the 
cases within the simulation range except for the zero custodial income situation.
Total bias using the “married withholding” method
Slb/S2 -1 in Equation (10) is the percentage bias in support amount generated 
using the gross income “married withholding” method compared to that generated from 
the “standardized net income” method. The formula shows that the number of children 
does affect the percentage bias, because the number of children affects how many 
exemptions can be claimed. Figures 3 shows the percentage bias in support award for two 
children by non-custodial gross income when custodial gross income is at $0, $6,000, 
$12,000, $24,000, $48,000, and $96,000.
Insert Figure 3 about here 
The support awards generated under the “married withholding” method are 
generally higher than that generated under the “standardized net income” approach, 
except for some cases where non-custodial income is lower than custodial income. The 
largest upward percentage bias is for the case of $12,000 non-custodial income and zero 
custodial income. The bias is 20% for one child, 20% for two children, and 21% for three 
children. The largest downward percentage bias is for the case of $12,000 non-custodial 
income and $96,000 custodial income. The bias is -17% for one child, -16% for two 
children, and -15% for three children.
As an example, a lower income household with $12,000 non-custodial income 
and $12,000 custodial income has a bias of 2% ($4 monthly overpayment) for one child, 
4% ($12 monthly overpayment) for two children, and 6% ($21 monthly overpayment) for
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three children. A middle income household with $36,000 non-custodial income and 
$24,000 custodial income has a bias of 1% ($5 monthly overpayment) for one child, 2% 
($14 monthly overpayment) for two children, and 4% ($32 monthly overpayment) for 
three children. A higher income household with $60,000 non-custodial income and 
$36,000 custodial income has a bias of bias of 4% ($32 monthly overpayment) for one 
child, 5% ($53 monthly overpayment) for two children, and 6% ($74 monthly 
overpayment) for three children.
The “married withholding” percentage bias patterns for one child and three 
children are similar to that of two children. For one child, the largest negative bias is - 
17% for $12,000 non-custodial income and $0 custodial income, while the largest 
positive bias is 29% for $12,000 non-custodial income and $96,000 custodial income. For 
three children, the respective numbers are -15% and 21% at the same income 
combination points.
Estimates of tax liability using the “married withholding” method are lower than 
estimates using the “single withholding” method because more withholding exemptions 
are claimed. With the exception of the zero custodial income case and some low custodial 
income/high non-custodial income combinations, the “married withholding” method 
tends to produce negative “income conversion” bias, meaning the estimated combined tax 
liability is higher than the actual combined tax liability, possibly due to the exclusion of 
child tax credit. However, the magnitude of the mostly negative “income conversion” 
bias is smaller than the mostly positive “income share” bias, resulting in a positive 
overall bias in most cases. Thus under the “married withholding” approach the child
19
support awards are typically higher than that generated from the “standardized net 
income” approach.
Total bias using the “married filing jointly” method
Sic/S2 -1 in Equation (11) is the percentage bias in support amount generated 
using the gross income “married filing jointly” method compared to that generated from 
the “standardized net income” method. The formula shows that the number of children 
does affect the percentage bias, because the number of children affects the number of 
exemptions, amount of EIC, and amount of child tax credit. Figures 4 shows the 
percentage bias in support award for two children by non-custodial gross income when 
custodial gross income is at $0, $6,000, $12,000, $24,000, $48,000, and $96,000.
Insert Figure 4 about here 
Within the simulation range, the maximum bias is 47% overpayment for child 
support in the case of non-custodial parent earning $12,000 a year and the custodial 
parent earning $0. The largest negative bias within the simulation range is -12% for the 
case of custodial parent earning $96,000 and the non-custodial parent earning $12,000.
In general, the lower the non-custodial parent’s income, the larger the magnitude 
of the bias, in both directions. As long as the income of the custodial parent is lower than 
or equal to the income of the non-custodial parent, the bias is positive. When the income 
of the custodial parent is much higher than the income of the non-custodial parent, the 
bias is negative.
As custodial parent’s gross income rises, the percentage overpayment in support 
award decreases, regardless of the income level of the non-custodial parent. The “married
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filing jointly” bias patterns for one child and for three children are similar to that of two 
children. For one child, the largest bias points are -14% for $12,000 non-custodial income 
and $96,000 custodial income, and 31% for $12,000 non-custodial income and $0 
custodial income. For three children, the respective biases are -10% and 47% for the 
same income combination points.
“Income conversion” bias is large when the two parents’ incomes are in disparity 
with one much higher than the other. That is because of the commonly referred to 
“marriage tax bonus” enjoyed by some households. In these cases not being able to file 
“married jointly” causes the combined tax liability to increase substantially, leading to a 
decrease in total combined net income. On the other hand, if both parents’ incomes are 
similar, then the combined net income under married filing jointly can be lower than the 
combined net income under separate fillings -  an example of marriage tax penalty. In this 
situation the “income conversion” bias is negative.
Selected Scenarios
Table 2 illustrates some examples of income combinations (gross and net) and 
bias decomposition under different gross-net conversion methods for a household with 
two children. The odd number cases (1, 3, 5, 7, and 9) are cases where the non-custodial 
parent is the sole earner, with annual gross income of $12,000, $24,000, $36,000,
$60,000, and $96,000. In these cases the “income share” bias is 0, because the non­
custodial parent earns 100% of either gross or net income. The even number cases, 2, 4, 6, 
and 8, show situations where both parents earn income. In these cases the “income share”
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bias is quite large, at 23%, 20%, 12%, and 9%, respectively under the three different 
conversion methods.
Insert Table 2 about here 
In all these nine cases, the support awards generated from the “single 
withholding” approach are the same as the “standardized net income” approach when the 
custodial income is zero. In all other cases the “single withholding” approach generates 
lower payments, ranging from -4% ($22 underpayment per month) for the 
$24,000/$12,000 combination to -8% ($57 underpayment per month) for the 
$36,000/$24,000 income combination.
The support awards generated from the “married withholding” approach and the 
“married filing jointly” approach are all higher than that from the “standardized net 
income” approach in these nine cases. The largest overpayment is 47% ($134 per month) 
for the $12,000/$0 income combination with the “married filing jointly” approach, 
followed by 28% ($138 per month) for the $12,000/$12,000 income combination with the 
“married filing jointly” approach. The smallest overpayment is 2% ($14 per month) for 
the $36,000/$24,000 combination under the “married withholding” approach, followed 
by 4% ($12 per month) for the $12,000/$12,000 combination.
While it is quite clear that the “married filing jointly” approach generates the 
largest bias, it is not as straight forward to judge whether the “married withholding” or 
the “single withholding” approach is better, with one likely to generate underpayment 
while the other overpayment. As the figures and the examples show, sometimes the bias 
can be quite large, making the guidelines particularly unfair to parents who happen to 
have certain income combinations.
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The results in this study show that in gross income share states, the child support 
awards tend to be biased, sometimes quite substantially, relative to the preferred awards 
that are generated from the “standardized net income” approach, due to both an “income 
share” bias and an “income conversion” bias. When states review their Child Support 
Guidelines, the issue of net income vs. gross income seems to come up quite a bit. Often 
it has been argued that each approach has its advantages and disadvantages. As such, 
most states opt to continue to use whatever method they have been using before. 
Philosophically, the “standardized net income” approach is better than both the “actual 
net income” and the “gross income” approaches in terms of the combined principles of 
equity and accuracy, while “gross income” approach has the advantage of being simple to 
administrate. Committees and experts conducting future reviews of States’ Child Support 
Guidelines should seriously consider the implications of this policy choice in order to 
make Child Support Guidelines as fair as possible to all parties involved. If the 
“standardized net income” approach cannot be adopted for political or technical reasons, 
there should be an awareness of the potentially large bias these “gross income” 
approaches can cause, with the “single withholding” method generally resulting in 
underpayments and the “married withholding” method generally resulting in 
overpayments.
For the purpose of this study, the tax structure of Utah is used. Other states’ tax 
structure may lead to larger or smaller biases. When considering their policy changes, 
states should conduct such bias studies using their own tax structure. In addition, tax
Conclusions
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codes change over time. If states continue to use the gross income share approach, such 
bias studies should be conducted every time there are major tax code changes that can 
affect the size of such bias in order for Child Support Guidelines policies to be up to date 
and reflect the actual economic situations of all parties involved.
It should also be noted that this study considers only uncomplicated cases with no 
joint custody and no unearned income. However these adjustments are usually made 
either before or after this base support award calculation process and therefore should not 
affect the general conclusion of this study.
In conclusion, it is strongly recommended that the income-shares states use the 
“standardized net income” approach with guidelines tables constructed by net income 
instead of gross income. The “standardized net income” approach is not difficult or 
complicated to use in this age of computing technology. Parents only need to report their 
gross income and the custody situation of the children due support. Computer programs 
can be implemented to automatically compute their respective net income taking into 
consideration filing status, exemptions, EIC, child tax credit, and FICA when applicable. 
This computation can be done with joint custody cases as well as split custody cases.
To go one step further, in order to maximize the combined net income, computer 
programs can be designed to configure the best allocation of children’s exemption status 
and assign as such (regardless of the actual custody arrangement). If it is deemed that the 
combined net income is the highest if the non-custodial parent claims the children for tax 
purposes, as in the case of zero or very low custodial income, then such an arrangement 
should be incorporated in the support agreement (instead of being negotiated and signed 
over each year). As a result of this claim status arrangement, the “standardized net
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income” approach would automatically increase the non-custodial parent’s support 
amount to reflect this net income increase of the non-custodial parent. When income 
situations of either or both parents change significantly, computations can be done again 
to reconfigure the optimal arrangement. In the end, the non-custodial parent, the custodial 
parent, and the children can all benefit economically from such an optimization process.
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States Child Support Guidelines Models
Percentage-of-income States Income-shares States Melson
Formula
Net Income Gross Income Net Income Gross Income Net Income
Alaska D.C California Alabama Delaware
Arkansas Georgia Connecticut Arizona Hawaii
Illinois Massachusetts Florida Colorado Montana
Minnesota Nevada Michigan Idaho
North Dakota Mississippi Nebraska Indiana



















1. PSI study (California) has classified New Hampshire has a net income state. An 
examination of New Hampshire’s support guidelines tables shows that there is one 
combined gross income converted into one combined net income leading to support 
amount. As such, although New Hampshire has the net income to gross income 
conversion process built into the support table, it is still using a gross income approach 
because net income is not computed for two parents separately.
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Table 2.
“Gross Income” Approach Bias in Selected Scenarios: Two Children
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 Case 7 Case 8 Case 9
Non-custodial parent gross income 12,000 12,000 24,000 24,000 36,000 36,000 60,000 60,000 96,000
Custodial parent gross income 0 12,000 0 12,000 0 24,000 0 36,000 0
Standardized net Combined net income 10,474 25,856 19,129 34,511 27,634 51,546 42,424 73,973 64,455
approach Monthly award 321 299 578 542 788 709 1,133 1,060 1,636
G Single Combined net income 10,479 19,176 19,176 27,678 27,678 42,382 42,382 64,150 64,150
r withholding Monthly award 321 275 578 520 788 652 1,133 1,007 1,636
o % bias (“income share” 0% -8% 0% -4% 0% -8% 0% -5% 0%
s bias + “income (0% (23% (0% (20% (0% (12% (0% (9% (0%
s conversion” bias) +0%) -31%) +0%) -24%) +0%) -20%) +0%) -14%) +0%)
Married Combined net income 12,616 21,752 21,752 30,115 30,115 47,119 47,119 71,242 71,242
i withholding Monthly award 385 311 659 569 859 723 1,258 1,113 1,816
n % bias (“income share” 20% 4% 14% 5% 9% 2% 11% 5% 11%
c bias + “income (0% (23% (0% (20% (0% (12% (0% (9% (0%
o conversion” bias) +20%) -19%) +14%) -15%) +9%) -10%) +11%) -4%) +11%)
m Married filing Combined net income 15,382 24,410 24,410 32,298 32,298 49,916 49,916 74,408 74,408
e jointly Monthly award 465 358 716 610 915 787 1,312 1,154 1,846
% bias (“income share” 47% 17% 28% 13% 17% 8% 18% 9% 15%
bias + “income (0% (23% (0% (20% (0% (12% (0% (9% (0%
conversion” bias) +47%) -8%) +28%) -7%) +17%) -4%) +18%) +0%) +15%)
Note: The monthly support award numbers are slightly different from the actual guidelines because the tax structure for different 
states and for different years are used. As per guidelines tradition, these base support awards exclude child care expenses and 
extraordinary medical expenses.
“Income Share” Bias in Support Award in “Gross Income” Approach by Non-Custodial 
and Custodial Annual Gross Income: Two Children
Figure 1.
— Custodial  parent incom e=$0 —■—Custodial parent income=$6,000 —a— Custodial parent income=$12,000 
— Custodial  parent incom e=$24,000 — Custodial  parent incom e=$48,000 — Custodial  parent income=$96,000
Figure 2.
Total “Single Withholding” Bias in Support Award by Non-Custodial and Custodial
Annual Gross Income Regardless of Number of Children
— Custodial  parent income=$0 — Custodial parent incom e=$6,000 —A— Custodial parent income=$12,000























Total “Married Withholding” Bias in Support Award by Non-Custodial and Custodial
Annual Gross Income: Two Children
— Custodial  parent incom e=$0 Custodial parent income=$6,000 —A— Custodial parent income=$12,000























Total “Married Filing Jointly” Bias in Support Award by Non-Custodial and Custodial
Annual Gross Income: Two Children
— Custodial  parent incom e=$0 —■—Custodial parent income=$6,000 —A— Custodial parent income=$12,000 




2004 Federal Tax Rate Schedules for Single, Head of Household, or Married Filing 
Jointly
If filing status is single (Stanc ard deduction=$4,850, Each exemption=$3,100)
Taxable income (I) range Tax is
$0 -  7,149 
7,150 -  29,049 










If filing status is head of household (Standard deduction=$7,150, Each 
exemption=$3,100)
Taxable income (I) range Tax is
$0 -  10,199 
10,200 -  38,899 
38,900 -  100,499 
100,500 -  162,699 








If filing status is married jointly (Standard deduction=$9,700, Each exemption=$3,100)
Taxable income (I) range Tax is
$0 -  14,299 
14,300 -  58,099 
58,100 -  117,249 
117,250 -  178,649 












2004 Federal EIC Formula
Filing single with no children
Earned income (I) range EIC is
$1 -  5,099 
$5,100 -  6,399 




Filing head of household with one child
Earned income (I) range EIC is
$1 -  7,649 
$7,650 -  14,049 




Filing head of household with two children
Earned income (I) range EIC is
$1 -  10,749 
$10,750 -  14,049 




Filing married jointly with one child
Earned income (I) range EIC is
$1 -  7,649 
$7,650 -  15,049 




Filing married jointly with two children
Earned income (I) range EIC is
$1 -  10,749 
$10,750 -  15,049 




Note: The formulas in this table are author’s computation from IRS’s EIC table for 2004. 
The category of married with no children is not included because it is not relevant to this 
study. The original EIC table can be found in IRS 2004 1040 Instructions. Retrieved on 
March 25, 2005 from the IRS Web site: http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1040.pdf
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Table A.3.
2004 Utah Tax Rate Schedule
If filing status is single or married filing separately (Standard deduction=Federal 
standard deduction, Each exemption=$2,325)
Utah taxable income (I) range Tax is
$0 -  863 I*2.3%
864 -1,726 20+(I-863)*3.3%
1,727 -  2,588 48+(I-1,726)*4.2%
2,589 -  3,450 85+(I-2,588)*5.2%
3,451 -  4,313 129+(I-3,450)*6%
Over 4,313 181+(I-4,313)*7%
If filing status is head of household or married filing jointly (Standard
deduction=Federal standard deduction, Each exemption=$2,325)
Utah taxable income (I) range Tax is
$0 -  1,726 I*2.3%
1,727 -  3,450 40+(I-1,726)*3.3%
3,451 -  5,176 97+(I-3,450)*4.2%
5,177 -  6,900 169+(I-5,176)*5.2%
6,901 -  8,626 259+(I-6,900)*6%
Over 8,626 362+(I-8,626)*7%
Source: Utah Individual Income Tax 2004 TC-40 Forms and Instructions. Retrieved on 
March 25, 2005 from Utah State Tax Commission Website,
http://tax.utah.gov/forms/current/tc-40inst.pdf. For the purpose of this study, Utah taxable 
income is Federal AGI minus federal standard deduction, minus total exemptions, and 
minus one half of federal tax.
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Table A.4.
2004 Federal Tax withholding Schedule for Annual Payroll Period
Single or head of household (Per exemption withholding allowance = $3,100 )
Withholding income (I) range Withholding amount is
$0 -  2,649 
2,650 -  9,699
9.700 -  30,799 
30,800 -  68,499 
68,500 -  148,699









Married (Per exemption withholding allowance = $3,100) )
Withholding income (I) range Withholding amount is
$0 -  7,999 
8,000 -  22,299 
22,300 -  64,749 
64,750 -  118,049 
118,050 -  185,549 









Source: IRS Publication 15-T (6/2003). New Withholding Tables For Wages Paid 




2004 Federal Advance EIC Payment Table
Single or head of household
Withholding income (I) range AEIC amount is
$0 -  7,659 





Married without spouse filing cer tificate
Withholding income (I) range AEIC amount is
$0 -  7,659 





Source: IRS Publication 15 (1/2004). (Circular E), Employer's Tax Guide (Table 7). 




2004 Utah Tax withholding Schedule for Annual Payroll Period
Single or head of household (Per exemption withholding allowance = $1,800 )
Withholding income (I) range Withholding amount is
$0 -  2,299 0
2,300 -  3,162 (I-2,300)*2.3%
3,163 -  4,025 20+(I-3,163)*3.1%
4,026 -  4,887 47+(I-4,026)*4.0%
4,888 -  5,749 81+(I-4,888)*4.9%
5,750 -  6,612 123+(I-5,750)*5.7%
Over 6,612 172+(I-6,613)*6.5%
Married (Per exemption withholding allowance = $1,800)
Withholding income (I) range Withholding amount is
$0 -  2,299 0
2,300 -  4,025 (I-2,300)*2.3%
4,026 -  5,749 40+(I-4,026)*3.1%
5,757 -  7,475 93+(I-5,750)*4.0%
7,476 -  9,219 162+(I-7,476)*4.9%
9,200 -  10,925 246+(I-9,200)*5.7%
Over 10,925 344+(I-10,926)*6.5%
Source: 2004 Utah Withholding Tax Guide. Retrieved on March 25, 2005 from Utah 
State Tax Commission Web site, http://tax.utah.gov/forms/pubs/pub-14.pdf
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Table A.7.
PSI Table of Support Proportions by Net Income: Rothbarth Parameters
Number of children
Net income ranges One Two Three
< $15,463 .2590 .3678 .4288
15,463 - 20,616 .2574 .3629 .4206
20,617 - 25,772 .2517 .3522 .4067
25,773 - 30,926 .2464 .3421 .3932
30,927 - 36,081 .2450 .3398 .3899
36,082 - 41,235 .2391 .3306 .3776
41,236 - 46,389 .2348 .3205 .3619
46,390 - 51,544 .2324 .3154 .3547
51,545 - 61,852 .2288 .3080 .3454
61,853 - 72,162 .2276 .3045 .3396
72,163 - 82,471 .2240 .2997 .3337
82,472 - 103,088 .2223 .2956 .3271
103,089 - 128,861 .2196 .2914 .3220
>128,861 .2127 .2776 .3025
Source: District of Columbia Child Support Guidelines Commission (2004): Report of 
the District of Columbia Child Support Guideline Commission Final Recommendations 
(Technical Appendix A Table 4). Retrieved March 21, 2005, from the Washington DC 
Office of Attorney General, Child Support Services Division Web site: 
http://csed.dc.gov/csed/cwp/view,a,3,q,588962,pm,1,csedNav,%7C31158%7C.asp
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